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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an increasing use of game

theory in psychological research.

Suppes and Atkinson (I960)

have demonstrated the similarities between game theory and
the Estes Stimulus Sampling model often employed for predict-

ing and interpreting two-choice learning data.

Other psy-

chologists, including Deutsch (1958). Hoffman, Pestinger, and

Lawrence (195^), and Thibaut and Kelley (1959), have employed
games in discussing and investigating various social structures and processes.

In their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Von
for
Neumann and Morgenstern (19^^) mathematically proved that
a
certain games a strategy exists which would assure players

minimal gain or loss.

This proof was based on the economist's

as the atconcept of "expected utility" which may be defined

tractiveness of the consequences of a behavior to the individual.

Below is an example of a 3 x 3 two-person game.

Both

(rows and
players, A and B, have three alternative choices

columns respectively).

The combination of their choices de-

termines the outcome of an event (cell).

choose alternative a^ and player

B,

b^^,

If player A were to

event a^b^ would

B would
occur and player A would win 11 utiles and player
to choose alterlose 11 utiles. Likewise, if player A were
occur and player
native a3 and player B. bg, event a3b2 would

)

)

A would lose h utiles and player B would win k utiles.

This

is called a zero-sum game since the amount one player wins,

the other player loses.
If player A were to choose alternative

a-^

in the game

below, he could win 1 or 2 utiles, depending on what column

player B selected.

Player A's poorest outcome for row a^ is
Similarly, hia poorest outcome for

therefore a 1 utile gain.

Player B's

rows 2 and 3 respectively are -12 and -4 utiles.

and b^, are -11, -1, and

poorest outcomes for columns h^,
-23 utiles.

Therefore player A can assure himself of winning

at least 1 utile by choosing alternative

a-^.

This is called

his maximin alternative because it maximizes his minimum gain.

Player B can assure himself of losing no more than

1

utile by

This is called his rainimax alterna-

playing alternative b2.

The combination

tive because it minimizes his maximum loss.

payoff
of these choices determines cell a^^bg which yields the
of 1 utile to A and the loss of 1 utile to B.

Thus this game

contains a saddle point, a cell which minimizes one player's
minimum
loss while at the same time maximizing the other's
gain.

Such a game is called "Strictly Determined."

Player B
bo

bi

b-^

Maximin Outcomes
(

Player A

Minimax Outcomes
(Columns

ai

2

1

1

aa

-12

-7

23

a3

11

8

-H

*Largest Row Minimum » Maximin
**Smallest Column Maximum = Minimax

Hows
1*

-12
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Little research has been conducted on the above class of
The bulk of decision making research has dealt with

games.

games which permit some degree of cooperation.

Thibaut and

translate charKelley (1959), for example, have attempted to
and
acteristics of small groups such as power, dependence,
theory.
status into the reward-cost language of game

They

matrix in such
have done this by structuring the reward-cost
control over the rewards
a way as to give one person varying
of the other.

Similarly, Wilson (I960) has investigated

structure and payoffs
forms of social control by varying the
of two-person games.

Hoffman, Pestinger, and Lawrence

(195*^-)

a group to comhave studied the tendency of members within
members in competipare their performance with that of other
the effect of peerage,
tive bargaining situations by examining
coalitions in
and importance of task upon the formation of

three-person games.

Deutsch (1958) and more recently Solomon

investigate interpersonal
(I960) employed two-person games to
trust.

behavior in more
Lleberraan (1958, 1959) has studied game
model outlined
competitive situations which conformed to the
determined
He employed both 2 x 2 and 3 x 3 strictly
above.
a minimax strategy.
games and found that Ss did learn to play
a single game for 200
In the latter study, pairs of Ss played
strategy was to
In this situation both Ss' minimax
trials.
question arises as
always play choice (row. column) 3- The
of a minimax solution
to whether the Ss learned the concept

which might be transferred to other similar games or merely
learned that choosing the bottom row in this particular game
yielded the greatest reward, i.e., simple discrimination or
"position habit."

Other investigators (Estes, 1957; Atkinson and Suppes,
1958) have reported that Ss did not behave in accord with

predictions based on the game model.

However, these investi-

gations can not be considered adequate tests of the predicastive power of the model in that In neither case were the

sumptions of the model strictly satisfied.

In the Testes

acknowlstudy the payoff in a 2 x 2 situation was merely an
edgment of whether the player was right or wrong.

Further-

not
more, the payoffs for any combination of choices were

probacertain or even defined for the players, but rather a
bility.

That is, if player one selected choice 1 and player

he was cortwo selected choice 2, player one would be told

he was correct 50% of the time and player two would be told
rect 50% of the time.

In the Atkinson and Suppes study the

they
players were not aware of the payoff matrix, nor were

directly informed of the responses of the other player.
argued
Estes (1957) and Atkinson and Suppes (1958) have
since it does
that the game model is not a behavior theory
the game expenot describe how behavior is modified through

rience of the individual.

Luce and Raiffa in their book

game theory is
Games and Decisions (1957) have cautioned that
theory.
not descriptive of behavior, but is a normative

It

5

does not describe how individuals play, it suggests a method
of play for the achievement of certain goals.

However, the

do choose a minimax strategy or

question of v^hether or not

under what conditions they approximate such behavior is an
empirical one, one which has not been adequately investi.^ated
in the studies cited above.

The present study deals with

this question.
The Model

The model under investigation in this study can be de-

scribed by the following statements:"^
1) Each player is presented with a finite number of

alternatives.
2) The games are by nature zero-sum.
3)

The games are strictly determined.

k) Each player knows the alternatives available both to
hira

and to his opponent, and he knows the outcome depends

upon these choices, i.e., he knows the game matric and its
functions.
5)

The outcomes of the games are "certain," i.e., the

outcome for any combination of opponents* choices is exactly

represented in the game matrix.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern employed the concept of
In this study the payoffs are poker
utility as cell payoffs.
for money. Thus this study can
transferable
chips which are
of the Von Neumann and
a
strict
test
considered
not be
1.

?1orgenstern theory.

6

6)

It is assumed that each player has a preference

ordering over these outcomes, and he knows his opponent's

preference pattern for the outcomes.
Variables to be Considered
A person's strategic decision is not solely a function

of the game matrix.

It seems reasonable to assume, and

Lieberraan's (1958, 1959) data would indicate that such a de-

cision would also be a function, among other things, of 1) an

opponent's strategy, 2) an individual's expectation of his
opponent's strategy, and 3) the value of the game.

2

The pur-

pose of the present study is to investigate the effects of
these three variables on the use of minimax and other strategies in games consistent with the model described above.

Opponent

'

s

Strategy

When playing competitive games, a player's decision is
seldom based upon the structure or nature of the game alone.

Explicitly or implicitly, the player may make some assumption
about how his opponent is playing.
In the Lieberman studies (1958, 1959) discussed above,
two Ss were required to play against each other.

Lieberman

did not control either strategy to determine how persons

The value of a strictly determined zero-sum game is
defined as the magnitude of the payoff in the saddle point
cell.
2.

7

would play against specific experimentally defined strategies.
In the present study, Ss play against one of two experimen-

tally defined strategies; random or minimax.

They are also

provided with three distinct choices, each structured so as
to provide a logical alternative strategy a priori

;

a miniraax

choice, a choice in which the average of the payoffs in that

row is the greatest of the three alternative rows, and a row

which contains the cell with the highest payoff in the matrix.

When playing against a minimax strategy Ss should learn
to play their own minimax.

expectation.

Two factors would lead to this

First, if Ss play anything but a miniraax alter-

native against a miniraax opponent they will lose.

Second,

if

Ss are able to note what E plays they will note that he always

plays his miniraax and their logical counter choice is their
own minimax alternative.

Those Ss who play against a random opponent will attain
a net gain by choosing either the minimax or the high average
row.

Since the latter is more profitable, it is predicted

that this group will choose the high average row more often

than any other.

However, since there is an alternative

(miniraax) which offers some gains,

the high average should

not be as often chosen by this group as the miniraax should be

by Ss playing against a minimax strategist.

Furthermore, Ss

playing against a minimax strategist should adopt their
strategy more rapidly and utilize it more consistently over
trials.

This prediction is based on the assumption that Ss

8

will be influenced by the knowledge of their opponent's
choices, an assumption supported by various sequential choice

studies (e.g., Anderson, I960).

play against a

rainiinax

In the case of the Ss who

opponent, knowledge of the opponent's

choices should facilitate the development of a minimax
strategy.

In the case of the Ss who play against a random

opponent, such knowledge should hinder the development of any

consistent strategy.

Expectation of Opponent

'

s

Strategy

game
It is reasonable to assume that an individual's
thinks his
strategy is in part a function of the strategy he

opponent is employing.

There is much psychological evidence

with
that demonstrates that a person behaves in accordance
his expectations about other people.
ample.

Hyman (1955)i for

©^c-

Indicates that responses during interviews are influ-

Hovenced by the interviewee's concept of the interviewer.
and Kelley (1953) have shown that the qualifica-

land,

Jams,

affect the
tions and perceived intentions of a communicator

acceptance of his communications.

Neiraark and Rosenberg

stimulus is
(1959) have shown that when a discriminative
situathought to be produced by another S in a two-choice
tion,

it is thought to
Ss' learning is retarded more than if

be merely a warning signal.

upon choices
In order to test the affect of expectation
in the game situation,

instructions are used to induce a

9

particular set.

Ss are told either that their opponent Is

rational or that his choices are purely random.

Combined

with the two strategies actually played against him, this

provides four instruction-strategy groups; rational-rational,
rational -random, random-rational

,

and random- random.

Instructions would not be expected to influence 3s'
much as they
playing against a consistent minimax opponent as

would 3s' playing against a random opponent.

It would seem

minimax stratthat if Ss are able to recognize a consistent
egy, as suggested above,

fect.

instructions would have little ef-

as in
However, when the opponent is not obvious, such

the random conditions,

instructions should have more influ-

ence on a S's game behavior.

Value
was zero.
The value of Lieberraan's game (Lieberraan, 1959)
that some Ss
Prom post-session interviews Lieberraan found
non-optimal
claimed that they were willing to gamble on
by playing
strate-ies because they stood to gain nothing

their minimax.

(e.g.,
It seems that with low value games

Lieberman's zero-value) the utility of a

3' s

choice of play

payoff of that
is not determined merely by the expected
such as winning an
choice, but is a function of other factors
gambling itself.
improbably high amount and the utility of
value games where the
It is therefore possible that in higher

relatively greater, the
assured payoff of a minimax choice is

10

utility of the non-monetary factors become relatively less
functional, thus motivating S to play his more conservative
miniraax choice.

To test for this effect, the games used in

this study will include a range of ten values.

Summary
This study is an attempt to Investigate the proposition

function of
that a person's choices in a game situation are a
the value
his espectations of his opponent's choices and also
of the game.

The S's expectation of his opponent's choices

the
are in turn a function of the instructions concerning

opponent and 3's observation of his opponent's choices.
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METHOD
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a

box containing a

3x3

10x15x4

inch cardboard

display of lights which indicated game

outcomes to S and E; 2 sets of 3 switches (1 set each for S
and E) with which to indicate choices of 3 and E;

2 8

xll

inch cardboard shields to prevent the players from seeing

their opponent's selections before the play was made; and a
pack of 270 game matrices on translucent tracing paper.

The

games were similar in structure; all being strictly deter-

mined and generated from the basic game below:
Player B

(

bi
ai

Player A

^2

Experimenter )
b2

b3

11 -7
1

8

1*

-10 -7

2

21

= saddle point

The rows and columns of the basic game were permuted to

yield

9

similar games.

In permuting rows and columns care

was taken that the saddle point fell once, and only once, in

each cell of the matrix.

A constant of 1 was successively

added to each cell of the 9 permuted matrices until the
values of the games ranged from 1 to 10.
or 90 similarly structured games.

Each

This yielded
f;ame

9x10

was repeated

12

three times during the experimental session yielding a full

series of

9x10x3

or 270 games.

The games were constructed so as to afford each S three

types of pure strategies which on an a priori basis

seeii.ed

to

have high attraction for Ss: a miniraax strategy; a high-

average payoff strategy where the mean of the three cells of
a particular row was considerably higher than the mean of

either of the other two rows; and a row which contained the
highest single cell value of the matrix.

Since at least one

cell in each of the S's rows yielded a higher payoff than a
cell in the same column of the other rows, none of the S's
rows could be logically eliminated on the basis that it con-

sistently yielded lower payoffs.

The three pure strategies

were equally distributed over all three rows.

Procedure

Upon entering the experimental room,
table opposite E.

taining the

3x3

S was seated at a

Between them on the table was the box condisplay of lights.

In front of each player

was the panel of three toggle switches and shield.

The 3 was

then given $1.50 worth of poker chips with which to play the
games with the understanding that at the end of the session
he oould exchange whatever chips he had accumulated for money,

minus $1.00 of the original stake.

Instructions for the particular condition were read to

13

S as he followed along on his own copy.

The instructions

for all conditions were identical except that for two conditions

(

rational -rational and rational-random) Ss were told

that inasmuch as E had to pay them each time they won, he

would play in such a way as to reduce their winnings.

For

the other two conditions (random-random and random- rat i onal
Ss were told that E's choices were completely random and had

been selected ahead of time.

Each of 100 Ss played E in a series of 270 games, 25 Ss
under each of the four conditions outlined above.

E placed a

sheet of translucent tracing paper containing a game matrix

on the box in front of the players.

S and E then examined

the game and indicated their choice of play by throwing the

appropriate toggle switch.

S's task was to choose one of

three possible rows labeled a^, ag, or a^.

E's task was to

choose one of three columns labeled b^, bg, or b^.

When both

decisions had been made and the appropriate switches thrown,
the light in the box corresponding to that cell in the game

matrix which was the intersection of S's row and E's column

lighted up.

The number of poker chips indicated by the

number in the activated cell was then given to or taken from
S.

S's response was recorded by E and the next game placed

in position on the game box.

This procedure was repeated

through all 270 games.

3.

Instructions are presented in Appendix A.

Ik

^.uestionnalre

After playing the games, 3s were interviewed by E,

The

interview was based on a questionnaire designed to attempt to

ascertain what strategies S thought he used and why, what
strategies he thought E had used, as well as such factors as
S's understanding of the rules of the game, how much he likes

gambling, and his motivation for winning.
Subjects

Subjects were 100 volunteer male undergraduate students
from the University of Massachusetts,

k.

The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
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HSSULTS

The 270 games played by each S were divided into nine

blocks of thirty trials.

In each successive block of trials

the ten value levels were repeated three times.

The basic

data for each of three analyses of variance (one for each of
S's three possible alternatives) were the number of choices
of a given alternative for each set of three trials at the

same value and trial block.

Tables

1,

2,

and

3

present the parallel analyses of

variance for miniraax, high-average, and high-cell choices
respectively.

Examination of these tables discloses a con-

sistent pattern of significant effects.

Strategy, value,

blocks, value by strategy, blocks by strategy, and value by

blocks are significant in all three analyses at the .05 level
or beyond.

Instructions, instructions by strategy, and value

by blocks by strategy are significant at the .05 level or

beyond in the miniraax and high-average analyses.
The strategy chosen by E accounts for the largest pro-

portion of the total variability in all three analyses of
variance.

Figure 1 represents the mean number of rainimax,

high-average, and high-cell choices per block of three trials

against a random or minimax strategy.

When E played a random

Although three specific analyses of variance were
computed, it should be noted that they are not completely
dependent inasmuch as 3s only had three possible alternatl
5.

1^

Table 1

Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' Minimax Choices

Source of Variance

Degrees
of Preedora

8999

Total

Between Ss
Instructions (I)
(S)
Strategy
I

99

114.70
10,497.60
142.90
9.81

11.69**
1070.09**
14.56**

9
8

2.71
21.38

B

72

I

9

.44
.72

s

9
9
8
8

3.98**
23.23**
1.69**
1.05
2.38*

1

1
1

X 3

96

Ss/I X S (1)

8900

Within Ss
Value (V)
Blocks (B)
V
V
V
V
B
B
B

V
V
V
V
B
V
* p

Mean
Squares

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

I X S
I

S
I X S
B X I
B X S
B X I X S
Ss/I X S (2)
Ss/I X S (3)
B X Ss/I X S ik)

1.62
.38
.31

53.12
1.11

8

.33
.46
.30
.68
.92
.26

72
72
72

864
768
6912

.55
.33

57.73**
1.20
1.26
1.76**
1.15

<.05 level of significance

** p <.01 level of significance
(1) Error terra for Instructions,

(4) Error term

I

x S

Vxl, VxS, VxIxS
for Blocks, Bxl, BxS, BxIxS
forVxB, VxBxI, VxBxS, VxBxIxS

(2) Error term for Value,
(3) Error term

Strategy,

17

Table 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' High Average Choices

of Freedom

Between Ss
Instructions (I)
(S)
Strategy

99

71.03
5906.52
75.53
13.31

1
1
1

X S
Ss/I X S (1)
I

96

5.33*

5.67*

8900

Within Ss
Value (V)
Blocks (B)
V X B
V X I
V X S
V X I X S

9
8

6.0k
20.89

9
9
9
8
8
8

1.29
5.26

n

B X I
B X S

B X I X S
V X B X I
V X B X S
V X B X I X S
V X Ss/I X S (2)
B X Ss/I X S (3)
V X B X Ss/I X S

p<.05

P

8999

Total

*

Mean
Squares

Degrees

Source of Variance

.68

.30
.29

29.68
1.07

AO

72
72

.61
.36
.93
.95
.35

72

B6k
768
(i^)

6912

6.k9**
21.98**
1 9^**
1.38
5.65**
.

.32
.30
31. 2i^**

1.12
1.14

1.02

level of significance

** p <.01 level of significance
(1) Error term for Instructions,

Strategy,

(2) Error terra for Value, V x I, V x S,
(3) Error term for Blocks,
(it-)

Error

terra

forVxB,

I

x S

V x I x S

BxIxS
VxBxI, VxBxS, VxBxIxS
Bxl, Bx3,

18

Table 3

Summary of Analysis of Variance for
Subjects' High Cell Choices

Variance
Source of^ „
.

Total

Degrees
Freedom
8999

Between Ss
Instructions (I)
(S)
Strategy

99

V
V
V
B
V

70.26**
1.12

9
8

1.95
^.15

72

.30

5.13**
7.83**
1.36*

9
9
8

2.53

6.65**

8

9.07

8

.11
.27
.25

.56

8900

.63

9

S
I X S
I
S
I X S
B X I
B X S
B X I X S

.22
.07

72
72
72

Ss/I X S (2)
Ss/I X S (3)
B X Ss/I X S {k)

p<.05 level

of significance

**

p<.01 level

of significance

(1) Error term for Instructions,

Error term for V x B,

3 X I,

.57
.13

17.11**
.20

1.22
1.13
i . uy

Strategy, I X S

(2) Error term for Value, V X I, V X S, V
(3) Error terra for Blocks ,

.24
.38
.53
.22

86^
768
6912

*

{^)

mt

96

Within Ss
Value (V)
Blocks (B)
V X B
V X I
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

5.30
^ ^
^ ^
655.60
10.50
9.33

1
1
1

I X S
Ss/I X S (1)

V
V
B
B
B
V

Mean
Sauares

B X S, B X

VxBxI, VxB

X S

I

sc

I

X S

X S, V X B X I X S

30

2 5

CHOICES

<
O

I-

o
J

ro

J)

LU
a.

z

2 0

I

I

5

A

MINIMAX
=HIGH AVERAGE
=

O =HIGH CELL

0

RATIONAL
RANDOM
STRATEGY PLAYED BY

E
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strategy, Ss played their minlmax alternative an average of

only .59 times in three games as contrasted with 2.7 times

against E«

s rainimax

strategy.

The mean number of high-aver-

age and high-cell alternatives played by Ss were 1.8 and .59
out of three respectively when E played randomly, but only
.018 and .005 respectively for Ss against whom E played
miniraax.

All but one S playing against a miniraax strategy learned
to play their own miniraax.

Playing against a random strategy

however, most Ss did not play any alternative consistently.

Two Ss did play the high average alternative consistently,
but the post-session interview disclosed that they realized

from the start that this choice would yield the highest overall expected payoff against a random strategist.

Thus their

choices can not be attributed to a game learning process.

Against a random strategy Ss did, however, make more
high average choices than either of the other two alternatives.

All but one of the 25 Ss in the rational -random group,

and all but five Ss in the random-random group selected more

high-average than either of the other two choices.

Pour of

these five Ss in the random-random group played more highcell than miniraax or high-average alternatives.

During the post-session interviews only two of the 50 Ss
who played against a miniraax-playing E described E's strategy
in terms of minimizing his losses.

the characteristics of E's choices.

Other Ss simply described
For example, they would
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"You always played the column with the low numbers.",

say,
or,

"...the column with two minuses."

Other Ss had diffi-

culty verbalizing E's choices, but when presented with a
series of games could indicate which choice E would make.

Pour Ss in the random- rational group claimed that E had
no strategy and one S wasn't sure.

Upon questioning, all

five made statements to the effect,

"You said you were ran-

dom.

When questioned as to whether or not they really be-

"

lieved

ji

played randomly, all replied, "Yes,

Of those Ss who played against a minimax strategy,

50!^

in the rational -rational and 53% in the random-rational

groups responded that E should have played differently in

order to minimize their winnings.
should have played randomly.

Some Ss suggested that E

Others suggested that he should

have made non-minimax choices once in a while in order to
force them from their minimax play.

Most Ss claimed that

they played their minimax because E played his.
The value effect was significant beyond the .01 level on
all three analyses.

The Ss showed a general tendency to play

more minimax and high-cell choices for higher value games

than for lower value games.

They tended to play more high-

average choices for lower value games than for higher value
game s *
A clearer picture of the value effect can be seen by

looking at its interaction with the strategy played by E.
The value by strategy effect was significant beyond the .01
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level on the high-average and high-cell analyses, and the .05
level on the ininimax analysis.

Figure

2

presents the mean

number of alternative choices across the 10 value levels
against a miniraax or random strategy.

The value of a game

has relatively little effect on S's choices when E consistently plays a minimax strategy.

When, however, E plays ran-

domly, the value effects mentioned above become accentuated.

The blocks and blocks by strategy effects were signifi-

cant beyond the .01 level on all three analyses.

Disregard-

ing the strategy played against them, Ss selected an in-

creasing number of miniraax alternatives over blocks of trials
and a decreasing number of high-average and high-cell choices.
However,

the strategy played against 3s dramatically effected

their choices over blocks.

Figure 3 presents the mean number

of alternative choices per block of trials against random or

minimax strategies.

When E played a minimax strategy, Ss

played an increasing number of minimax choices over blocks
and a decreasing number of high-average and high-cell choices.

When E played a random strategy, Ss played an increasing number of high-average alternatives for the first 60 games and
then fewer over the remaining 210 games.

The curve for the

number of minimax choices played by 3s shows a fluctuating
decline over the 270 games, while the high-cell choices show

an initial decline over the first 90 games but an increase
over the last 180.

Although the value by trials interaction proved to be
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significant beyond the .05 level for high-cell choices and
the .01 level for high-average and minimax choices, the value

by trials by strategy interaction gives a truer picture of
this effect inasmuch as the nature of the value by trials

interaction is very much dependent upon the strategy played
by E.

The value by trials by strategy interaction was sig-

nificant beyond the .01 level on both the minimax and highaverage analyses, but not significant on the high-cell
analysis.

Against either a minimax or random strategy, Ss initially made more minimax choices for high value games than for
lovf

values.

Against a minimax strategy, however, they in-

creased their number of minimax choices over trials, while

decreasing them against a random strategy.

In both cases the

rate of increase or decrease is greater for higher than lower

value games during the early trials, but after 60 to 120

games the differences in these rates between high and low
value games is negligible.

Against either a minimax or a random strategy, 3s initially made more high average choices for lower value games
than higher value ones.

Against a random strategy, however,

Ss increased their number of high average choices for the

first 60 to 90 games and then showed a slow decrease over the

remainder of the games.

Against a minimax strategy, they

showed an immediate and sharp decrease.

In both cases the

initial increase or decrease was greater for lower than
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higher value games.

The slow decline against a random strat-

egy was somewhat greater for higher than lovrer value games.

After 90 to 120 games against a minimax strategy, the differences between low and high value games were negligible.
The instructions effect was significant at the .05 level

on the high-average analysis and the .01 level on the minimax.
Figure

ka.

presents the mean number of minimax and high-aver-

age choices per block of three trials for the two instruction
groups.

The Ss played more minimax and fewer high-average

alternatives when told that their opponent was rational than

when told he was playing randomly.
Figure ^b presents the mean number of minimax and highaverage choices for the two instruction groups against random

and minimax strategies.

It is evident from Pig\ires ka and 4b

that instructions were effective only when a random strategy

was played against 3s.

Inspection of Figure 4b also indi-

cates that against a minimax strategy Ss made more minimax

choices and against a random strategy, more high-average

choices regardless of the instructions given them.

Questionnaire results relevant to the instructional set

given to the Ss show that 13 out of 25 Ss in the rationalrandom group stated that they thought that E had a strategy,
eight said he had no strategy, and four didn't know.
Ss in the random-random group stated that

_a

Seven

had a strategy,

15 said no, and three didn't know.

Twenty- three Ss in the rational -random group mixed their
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choices relying on no alternative in
particular.

Two Ss in

this group, although playing a mixture of
all three alternatives, relied most heavily on high-average
choices.
Ten Ss
in the random-random group played a mixed
strategy, while 11
played a mixed strategy which relied heavily on
high-average

choices.

Nine Ss in the rational-random group indicated they
thought ^'s choices depended on what they played, as
opposed
to none in the random-random group.

Seventeen Ss in the

rational -random group indicated that E tried to influence
their choices by making certain choices of his own compared
to three in the random- random group.

Seventeen Ss in the rational-random group claimed that
their choices depended upon S's choices as contrasted to four
Se in the random-random group.

Eight Ss in the rational-

random group stated that they tried to influence E's playing
by making certain choices of their own compared to one S in
the random- random group.
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DISCUSSION

In the present study the strategy played against S was

the strongest single factor determining how he played.

Exam-

ination of the data suggests two possible explanations for
this effect: discrimination and imitation.

Against a consis-

tent strategy, such as a miniraax strategy, Ss learned to play
a consistent counter strategy.

The games employed in this

study were such that if 3 played any alternative but his
miniraax when playing against a miniraax strategist,

chips.

he lost

Against a rainimax playing opponent, then, the task

might be considered a straightforward discrimination problem;

play miniraax and win, play anything else and lose.

Such a

task does not require 3s to concentrate on what their oppo-

nent plays, only on those characteristics which discriminate
their own miniraax row.

This explanation is supported by the

fact that many Ss in the rational-rational and random-rational groups either were unable to verbalize their opponent's

strategy or claimed a had no strategy despite the fact that
all but one of them learned to play a minlmax strategy con-

sistently.

It is suggested that if games were employed in

which non-miniraax choices did not necessarily lead to a loss
of chips, the discrimination task would not be as simple and
Ss might not as easily learn the minimax solution.

In further support of the above explanation, over half

of the Ss playing against a minimax strategist claimed E

played unwisely.

It Is apparent that these Ss did not learn

the rationale for a minimax solution.

Perhaps if the task

were less mechanical, requiring Ss to concentrate on the outcomes of the various combinations of alternatives, more of
them would have learned the rationale of a minimax solution.
A game situation in which two Ss play against each other

would require greater concentration on the task and also provide experience of outcomes of alternatives other than mini-

Lieberman (1953, 1959) found that Ss playing each other

max.

a single game did learn to play minimax in 90 to 150 trials.

However, the solution was always the same, either row 3 or

column

3.

A series of similar games in which the minimax

alternative varied over the three rows and columns would require the Ss to generalize their strategy to other games.

Against a random strategy, Ss were not consistently rewarded or punished for choosing any particular alternative.
Therefore, Ss would not be expected to learn to play any al-

ternative consistently.

Over a number of trials, however,

they should have accumulated more chips by playing their

high-average alternative.

This might explain why Ss playing

against a random strategy, in general, made more high-average
than minimax or high-cell choices.

Also the high-average row

provided a two-thirds chance of winning a middle range value
payoff, compared to a sure but low value payoff for the mini-

max row, and one-third chance of winning a high value payoff
for choosing the high-cell alternative.

It is possible that
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Ss were attracted to the favorable two-thirds probability
of

the high-average alternative.

A test for this suggestion

would be to provide games in which the high-average row has
only a one- third chance of winning.
The second possible explanation for the strategy effect
is that Ss attempted to imitate their opponent's strategy.

Evidence from two-choioe situations which involve S's predicting which of two discrete events will occur In each of a
series of trials, have demonstrated a strong tendency on the

part of Ss to estimate closely the probability of each

event's occurring.

Since against the rational -rational and

randoiD-rational groups E always played his miniraax, those Ss

would be expected to learn to play their minlmax, i.e.,
"match" E's play, after an initial period where they learned
to discriminate the characteristics of £*s choice and the

fact that he never deviated from that choice.

That Ss were

able to discriminate E's choice, though perhaps not being
able to verbalize it, was demonstrated during the interview

where most Ss were able to indicate what E's choice would be
on any given trial.

6

Against a randomly playing opponent Ss

would not be expected to play any consistent alternative
since E did not play a consistent alternative.
It is possible in these terms to consider the Ss in the
6. This is consistent with evidence from concept formation research (e.g., Mair, 1931; Hees and Israel, 1935) which
has demonstrated that Ss are often able to perform tasks adequately without being able to verbalize their solution.
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present study to have imitated or "matched" E's behavior by

approaching In their choices of mlnimax rows, the frequency
with which E chose the minimax column, i.e., one hundred percent of the choices.

This would apply to those 50 Ss who

played against a minimax-playing E.

Since E consistently

chose the minimax column, no test is possible among these Ss
of whether their minimax choices would Increase or decrease

with increases or decreases in S's minimax choices.
The data of the 50 Ss who played against a random-play-

ing a do provide a basis for crudely testing the "matching"

hypothesis, since E's choice of minimax columns did vary from
one block of 30 trials to another (see Figure 5).

When the

Ss* mean number of minimax choices is comijared with the num-

ber of times E played his miniruax alternative in the preceding block, Ss generally increased their minimax choices

when E had increased his minimax choices and decreased when E
decreased.

The "matching" effect is also suggested by simi-

lar inspection of block by block choices for the high-average
alternative.
The fact that the strategy played against Ss is such a

powerful determinant of their choices suggests that a systematic manipulation of various strategies might be carried
out.

Would Ss learn to play a consistent strategy against a

consistent strategy other than a minimax, for example a consistent high-average strategy?
rainlmeLX

Also, various percentages of

choices might be employed to ascertain at what level

O
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Ss no longer played a consistent rainimax solution.

Whether

Ss would attempt to match the percentage of miniraax choices

played against them as suggested by the evidence from twochoice studies, or if such a situation would provide enough

experience with the consequences of non-rainimax alternatives
that they learn the rationale for minimax play is yet to be

empirically determined.
Against a random-playing opponent the decline of the

high-average choices and increases of high-cell choices over
the later blocks might be attributed, in part to

tiie

possi-

bility that 3s initially played high-average alternatives in
order to accumulate a store of chips.

Once they were secure

in the amount of chips accumulated, they could afford to play
the high-paying, high-risk, high-cell alternative instead of
the high-average.
It is apparent that when Ss are sure of their opponent's

strategy factors such as the value of the game and instructions have very little effect.

t</hen,

however, an opponent's

strategy is highly ambiguous (e.g., random) such factors do
effect Ss choices.

Figure 6 shows the number of times E played each of his

alternatives at each value level.

A comparison of Figures 2

and 6 indicates that Ss had some success in predicting E's

minimax choices, but little in predicting his high-average or
high-cell choices.
The similarity between Ss' and E's minimax choice
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patterns raises some doubt as to whether Ss played rainimax
more often for higher value games because higher values were

more attractive or because they were able to predict E's
choices.

A

closer examination of the results would indicate

that the former is generally true, but the latter is true for

later games.
The value by blocks by strategy interaction showed that
Ss initially chose more rainimax alternatives for higher value

games than for lower value games.

This would support the

contention that when an opponent's strategy was ambiguous,
for example in the early games before Ss had a chance to

estimate how often E played his miniraax, Ss played more rainimax for higher value games than for lower value games.

In

later games, after they had a chance to observe E's behavior,
they apparently attempted to predict his rainimax choices.

For higher value games Ss played more conservatively
(minimax) and at the same time took more risks (high cell)

than they did for lower value games.

Apparently the magni-

tude of the high-cell and the assured positive payoffs of the
rainimax choices became relatively more attractive compared to

the negative-to-middle range payoffs offered by the high-

average choice.

It appears that for low value games where Ss

had to risk too much in making high-cell choices and where
the assured payoff of the miniraax choice was negligible,

Ss

preferred to make high-average choices which afforded a twothirds chance of winning.

For higher value games the
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probability of a middle range payoff became relatively less
attractive compared to the relatively

hi,;h,

sure win of the

minimax and the relatively low-risk, hi^^h-payof f

,

high-cell.

Suppes and Atkinson's (I960) demonstration that 3s in a

two-choice situation tend more toward an optimal play for
games involving relatively higher payoffs is consistent with
the findings of this study that Ss play more minimax alterna-

tives for higher value games.

The results of this study con-

cerning the affect of relative values on high-cell choices
indicates the need for further research involving games in
which the relative risk of the high-cell alternative increases or remains constant as the value of the payoff increases,

instructions also proved to be influential on
choices only when E played randomly.

Ss'

Questionnaire results

indicated that under this condition different Instructions
induced somewhat different concepts of 3s' opponent.
fi's

Since

choices against the rational -random and random-random

groups were identical, the S's choice differences in these
two groups must be attributed to the instructions given them.

The fact that Ss in the random-random group relied more

heavily on high-average choices than did Ss in the rationalrandom group may, in part, be explained by the evidence from
the questionnaire which indicated that the 3s in the former

group were less prone to be influenced by and to look for
patterns in E's choices than were Ss in the latter group.

It
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Is possible that the former Ss were more attracted
to the

high-average alternative because it provided a two-thirds
chance of winning a middle range payoff as opposed to a twothirds chance of losing by playing a high-cell alternative,
or winning a small payoff by playing a miniraax alternative.

On the other hand, Ss who expected E to be playing some sort
of strategy might not be as attracted to the high-average

alternative because they were more concerned with looking for
a pattern in E's choices.

The payoffs in this study were in terms of poker chips

which in turn were transferable for money.

Game theory, how-

ever, as presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), de-

fines payoffs in terras of utilities.

Thus poker chips in

this study are used as approximations of utilities.

To the

degree that these approximations are adequate, the results of
this study are not restricted to monetary payoffs, but may

extend to any situation, be it economic, military, political,
or social, where decisions can be translated into game theory

language and payoffs into some approximation of utilities.
For example in military parlance, cell payoffs may be defined
in terms of number of troops and equipment lost or destroyed,

winning or losing of battles, the amount of time needed for
delaying tactics, etc.

In political situations utilities may

be in terras of war or not war, making friends of foreign

countries, loss or gain of prestige, etc.

With regard to

social situations, utilities may be in terms of gain or loss
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status, opportunity to meet new or influential
people,
isf action derived from various social
interactions, etc.

^0

SUMMARY

Although there has been considerable
interest in decision making and the application of
game theory models to certain psychological problems in recent
years, there has been
little Investigation of the variables
influencing game behavlor.
This study was an attempt to investigate
some of these
variables affecting the playing of
two-person strictly determined games. The major questions asked
were:
1.

Vvhen

playing a series of similarly structured,

strictly determined games, do intelligent
persons learn to
make strategy choices consistent with
deductions from a game
theoretic model?
How does the strategy played against
an individual
influence the strategy he employs?
2.

How does an individual's expectation of
his opponent's strategy influence his own strategy?
3.

Do intelligent persons play high
value games differently than they play low value games?
^.

How do intelligent persons modify
their strategy with
experience?
5.

One hundred Ss were assigned to
one of four conditions;
rational-rational, rational -random, randomrational, or
random-random,
.^ach 3 was told in everyday language
either
that his opponent would play
randomly or in such a way as to
minimize S's winnings.
Rither a minimax or a random strategy
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was played against

larly structured

hira.

3x3

i^ach S

played a series of 270 simi-

strictly determined games against

E.

The series contained 10 value levels
from one through 10.
Ss
were provided with three types of
choices: a minimax in which
the row contained the saddle point
of the game, a high average in which the average of values
in the cells of that row
was higher than of any other row.
and a high cell in which
that row contained the highest valued
cell of the game matrix.
The spatial ordering of these choices
in the matrix was
varied unsystematically from game to
game.
The particular

choice made by each 3 for each game was
recorded.

Three

analyses of variance were computed,
one for each class of 3s'
choices.
Results from this study are generally
consistent with
deductions from the game theoretic model
employed. The
strategy played against 3s proved to be
the most potent factor affecting: their choices.
When playing against a consistently minii.iax-playing opponent, 3s
learned quickly to play a
minimax strategy themselves.
When playing against a random
strategy, Ss did not learn to play
any one strategy consistently, but relied most heavily
on high average choices which
produced the highest monetary yields.
Against a random opponent, Ss also were affected by
other factors such as the
value of the game and their expectations
of their opponent as
presented to them through instructions.
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front of us.
You will win or lose the number of chips indicated in the corresponding cell of the game matrix.
As an example, in game matrix I above (turn back and
look at game matrix I), if you choose row ai, and I choose
column hi, you would win 11 chips.
If, on the other hand,
you choose a^, and I choose bg, you would lose seven chips.

When we have played a game, I will tell you to return
your switch to the "off" position (back
toward you).
I
will then give to you or take from you the number of chips
indicated on that play. We will then go on to the next game
matrix and you will make another choice of a^, ap, or a-j.
I
will also make another choice of bi, b2, or b3.

—

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS SO PAR?

Instructions For Rational Groups

Remember your task is to win as many chips as you can.
You are playing against me.
Inasmuch as I have to pay you
each time you win, I will try to play in such a way as to
reduce your winnings.
Instructions For Random Groups
Remember, your task is to win as many chips as you can.
You are playing against me.
However, I am not really competing with you. My choices for each game have already been
decided before heind. No matter what your choices are, I will
not change my choices which have already been selected.
I am
a purely chance or random opponent.
That is, in making my
choices ahead of time I did not consider the nature of the
games.
When I made ray choices I simply reached into a hat
blindly and pulled out a number from 1 to 3 to determine what
choice I would play for any particular game.
In every game
choices b,
b2, or b3 all have an equal chance of being
played by me.
,

ANY QUESTIO?JS ABOUT WHAT

I

MEAN WHEN

PUliELY CHANCE OR RANDOM OPPONENT?

I

SAY THAT

I

AH A

ANY QUESTIONS SO PAR?
In front of you is II.50 worth of poker chips.
1
1
1

white chip » 1/10 of a cent » 1 point in the game matrix
red chip « 10 white chips = 1 cent
blue chip = 10 red chips = 100 white chips =« 10 cents
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At the end of the games you will give back to rae i^l.OO
worth of chips and I will give you money for the rest of the
chips which you have accumulated.
Thus, if you just break
even in the games you will receive $.50 for showing up (the
$.50 you did not give back to rae).
If you should lose at the
games you may lose all or any part of that $.50.
You can
not, of course, lose any of your own money.
You can however
win more than v. 50.
This experiment is being sponsored by a
research foundation so don't be afraid to win as much as you

can.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
Remember, in each game you choose row a-,, a?, or a-a.
Then throw switch a^L* ^2* ^r ao corresponding to your choice.
I will similarly choose column bn, bp, or bq.
The combination of our choices will be indicated by on§ of the lights on
the box in front of us.
You will win or lose the number of
chips indicated in the corresponding cell of your game matrix.
We will then go on to the next game matrix and make our
choices for that game.

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE
Do you like to gamble?
yes

no

Do you know anything about the theory of games?

yes

no

If yes, where did you

le&m

what you know?

If yes, do you think it helped you in playing the
games?

yes

no

Do you know anything about probability theory?
yes

no

If yes, do you think it helped you in playing the
games?

yes

no

Were the instructions concerning what you were to
do
clear to you?
yes

no

If no, what was unclear?
VIere the

instructions concerning what
clear to you?
yes

I

was ffoin? to do

no

If no, what was unclear?

Were there anything in the instructions that were
not
clear?
yes

no

If yes, what?
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Did the Instructions concerning how I was
going to Dlav
the games help or hinder you in deciding how
to ^
play the
games?

help

hinder

no

?

If I had told you that I was going to play
(rationally,
randomly) would you have played differently?

yes

no

?

If yes, how?
In making a choice of play was your choice based
primarily on how many chips you could win if you played
intelligently (as opposed to the desire to ramble for
example)

yes

no

mostly

Any other factors involved?

If so, what?

How did you play the games?

What strategies did you use?

mm

X

HC

mixed

Did your strategy change at all during the games,
i.e..
did you use more than one strategy?
yes

no

If yes, why?
If yes, describe those strategies not already
described,
and when you used one in preference to another?

Did your choices depend upon what choices
yes

I

was making?

no

During the games did you try to influence my choices by
making certain choices of your own?
yes

no

If yes, describe what you did?

Now that the games are over do you think there
was any
best strategy?

yes

no

If yes, what was it?

?

^9
15.

Did
did

I
I

have a strateffv*?
use?

yes

finw

t

^

t
o
Pl^^?

What strategy ( ies)

no

16.

Did

17.

Did ™y Choices depend
upon wh«t choices you
were „aMngT

19.

strategy change at all
during the games?
yes
no
?
n,y

yes

no

yes

no

I

played fairly with you?

no

If no, in What way do
you think I played unfairly?
If no, did this effect
the way you played the
ga.es.
Are you satisfied with
the way you played the
ga.es?
yes
no
If no,

22.

in what way were they
not fair?

Do you think that

yes

21.

?

Do you feel that the
games were fair?
yes
no
If no,

20.

?

in what way are you
not satisfied?

Did you enjoy playing
the games?

yes

Why?

no
(Why not?)

-p"^?iSt\%1iJJ''LL°„|^;a-t participating 1„
yes^

no

If no, why not?

Thank you very much for
your time.
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